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A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO VOTING TRUSTS 
John J. Woloszynt 
Subsequent to incorporation of a business, the question arises as to 
how the stockholders are to maintain control of the business. 
Among those devices available to counsel is the voting trust. The 
author reviews the history of the voting trust, its treatment by the 
courts and legislatu~es, and examines several types of provisions 
which should be employed in drafting the voting trust agreement. 
The corporate practitioner frequently is faced with the problem of 
structuring devices designed to maintain control of corporations. A list of 
such devices includes: 1) the classification of shares; 2) cumulative voting of 
shares; 3) higher voting or quorum requirements for stockholders' or 
directors' action; 4) the classification of directors; 5) the use of holding 
companies; 6) stockholders' pooling agreements; and 7) irrevocable 
proxies. 1 Another device for maintaining control of a corporation is the 
voting trust. 
A voting trust is simply a trust of stock which is created when 
participating stockholders execute a written trust agreement and, pursuant 
to the agreement, endorse and transfer their stock certificates and the legal 
title to their shares to a voting trustee. The trustee, in turn, registers the 
transfer of the shares on the corporation's books, thus becoming the record 
holder of the shares. The participating stockholders are issued certificates 
of beneficial ownership evidencing their remaining equitable interest in the 
stock held pursuant to the trust agreement. During the term of the voting 
trust, the trustee votes the shares as directed by the trust agreement. 
Dividends and other asset distributions of the corporation, although 
governed by the trust agreement, are usually remitted by the voting trustee 
to the beneficial owners. 
The voting trust is a simple and effective way to transfer voting control of 
a corporation. The stripping of voting rights from shares is self-executing 
because the trustee is the legal owner and is registered as such on the stock 
ledgers of the corporation. Thus the voting trust avoids the problems 
attendant to pooling agreements and proxies, that of seeking judicial 
t A.B., 1966, Rutgers University; J.D., 1969, University of Maryland; Lecturer in Law, 
University of Baltimoi-e School of Law, 1974-; Associate, Weinberg and Green, Baltimore 
Maryland. 
1. For a discussion of the various devices available.for maintaining corporate control, see W. 
CARY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 362-451 (4th ed. 1969); 5A Z. CAVITCH, 
BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS §§lOS.01-.05 (1963) [hereinafter cited as CAYITCH]; 1 F. O'NEAL, 
CLOSE CORPORATIONS §§5.01-.39 (1971) [hereinafter cited as O'NEAL]; W. PAINTER, 
CORPORATE AND TAX ASPECTS OF CLOSELY HELD CORPORATIONS §§3.1-.6 (1970). 
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enforcement of the voting commitments. 2 "Adroit Lawyers," Professor 
Ballantine once commented, "have invented the ingenious device of a 
voting trust to give what is in essence a joint irrevocable proxy for a term of 
years the 'protective coloring' of a trust, so that the trustees may vote as 
owners rather than as mere agents."3 This separation of voting rights also 
survives transfers by the beneficial owners of their interests, for they will 
transfer only the equitable interests represented by the voting trust 
certificates. Upon the expiration of the term of the voting trust, the 
beneficial owners normally will exchange their voting trust certificates for 
stock certificates and they will be reinstated as legal owners, registered as 
such, on the corporation's books. 4 
In the latter part of the nineteenth and early part of the twentieth 
century, voting trusts were regarded by some American courts with 
suspicion, if not outright hostility. For example, in the leading case of 
Warren v. Pim,5 a New Jersey court described the voting trust as "a 
masterpiece of professional ingenuity which confides absolute and uncon-
trolled discretion to a group whose personal stake in the success of the 
company is so insignificant that it may be disregarded entirely,"6 and the 
voting trustee as "only a sham owner vested with a colorable and fictitious 
title for the sole purpose of permanently voting upon stock that [he] does 
not own."7 
These early decisions often held that voting trusts were invalid per se, 
usually on the ground that the separation of voting rights from stock 
2. See, Ringling v. Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc., 29 Del. Ch. 318, 
49 A.2d 603 (1946), modified, 29 Del. Ch. 610, 53 A.2d 441 (Sup. Ct. 1947), for an example 
of the problems in enforcing a pooling agreement. The lower court granted, in effect, spe-
cific performance of a stockholders' pooling agreement. The Chancellor found an implied 
covenant in the pooling agreement giving the non-breaching party an irrevocable proxy to 
cast the votes represented by the shares held by the breaching party. On appeal, however, 
the Delaware Supreme Court differed with the Chancellor as to how the agreement should 
be enforced. The Supreme Court found no irrevocable proxy to vote the breaching party's 
shares. Instead, the court held that the breaching party's votes were to be given no effect. 
Thus, the only effective votes cast at the stockholders' meeting in dispute were the votes 
of the non-breaching party and those of. the remaining 37% stockholder who was not a 
party to the agreement. For a discussion of the enforceability of irrevocable proxies, see 
1 O'NEAL §§5.04, 5.11; Comment, Irrevocable Proxies, 43 TEx. L. REV. 733 (1965). 
3. H. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS §l84 (rev. ed. 1946). 
4. For discussions of voting trusts, see generally J. LEAVITT, THE VOTING TRUST (1941); 
Ballantine, Voting Trusts, Their Abuses and Regulation, 21, TEX. L. REV. 139 (1942); 
Bergerman, Voting Trusts and Non-Voting Stock, 37 YALE L. J. 445 (1928); Burke, Voting 
Trusts Currently Observed, 24 MINN. L. REV. 347 (1940); Finkelstein, Voting Trusts 
Agreements, 24 MICH. L. REV. 344 (1926); Giles, Is the Voting Trust Agreement a "Dan-
gerous Instrumentality"? 3 CATH. U. L. REV. 81 (1953); Gose, Legal Characteristics 
and Consequences of Voting Trusts, 20 WASH. L. REv. 129 (1945); Smith, Limitations on 
the Validity of Voting Trusts, 22 COL. L. REV. 627 (1922); Wormser, The Legality of 
Corporate Voting Trusts and Pooling Agreements, 18 COL. L. REV. 123 (1918); Note, The 
Voting Trust, 34 N.Y.U.L. REV. 290 (1959); Annot., 98 A.L.R. 2d 376 (1964). 
5. 66 N.J. Eq. 353, 59 A. 773 (1904). 
6. Id. at 364, 59 A. at 781. 
7. Id. at 386, 59 A. at 785. 
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ownership was against public policy. 8 Other decisions, eventually evolving 
into the majority view, upheld these agreements if grounded upon a proper 
motive or bona fide business purpose. 9 Even with the eventual judicial 
approval of the voting trust, a circumspect attitude towards them did not 
quickly abate. Typical of this attitude was Mr. Justice Douglas' descrip-
tion, during his association with the Securities and Exchange Commission, 
of the voting trust as "fittle more than a vehicle for corporate 
kidnapping." 10 Generally, the SEC opposes the use of voting trusts unless 
justified by special circumstances,l1 and the New York Stock Exchange 
refuses to list voting trust certificates. 12 
At present, corporate laws exist in most states13 and in the District of 
Columbia, authorizing and regulating the use and terms of voting trusts. l' 
The Maryland law governing voting trusts provides: 
Anyone or more stockholders of a corporation may confer upon a 
trustee or trustees the right to vote or otherwise represent their 
shares for a period not to exceed ten years, by entering into a 
written voting trust agreement specifying the terms and conditions 
of the voting trust, by depositing an executed copy of the agreement 
with the corporation at its principal office, and by transferring their 
shares to such trustee or trustees for the purposes of the 
agreement. 15 
Despite statutory authorization, the validity of a particular voting trust 
continues to depend upon the objectives and purposes of the agreement. Of 
course, a voting trust agreement may be invalid because it fails to comply 
with the statutory requirements. 
The various state laws generally fail to delineate proper and lawful 
objectives for a voting trust and the statutes generally do not require that 
the voting trust agreement actually state a specific business purpose or 
objective. In a Maryland case, Holmes v. Sharetts,16 the plaintiffs con-
tended that a voting trust was invalid because the trust agreement did not 
8. See also Bostwick v. Chapman, 60 Conn. 553, 24 A. 32 (1890); Luthy v. Ream, 270 Ill. 170, 
llO N.E. 373 (1915); Bridges v. First Nat'l Bank, 152 N.C. 293, 67 S.E. 770 (1910); Harvey 
v. Lineville Imp. Co., ll8 N.C. 693, 24 S.E. 489 (1896). 
9. See Mackin v. Nicollet Hotel, Inc., 25 F.2d 783 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 278 U.S. 618 (1928); 
Bankers Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Sloss, 229 Ala. 26, 155 So. 371 (1934); Bowditch v. 
Jackson Co., 76 N.H. 351, 82 A. 1014 (1912); Alderman v. Alderman, 178 S.C. 9, 181 S.E. 
897 (1935); Carnegie Trust Co. v. Security Life Ins. Co., 111 Va. 1, 68 S.E. 412 (1910). 
10. W. DOUGLAS, DEMOCRACY AND FINANCE 43 (1969). 
11. Unless qualified by the special and unusual circumstances of the case, the Com-
mission has opposed the voting trust because it disenfranchises stockholders who 
are entitled to a voice in the management of the enterprise. 
SEC, Fifteen Annual Report 146 (1948). 
12. NYSE COMPANY MANUAL §A15. 
13. Except Massachusetts. 
14. Citations to the various statutes authorizing voting trusts are collected at ABA-ALI MODEL 
Bus. CORP. ACT §34, ~6 (1971); 5A CAVITCH §1l1.01 n.2. I' 
15. MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, §45 (1973). 
16. 228, Md. 358, 180 A.2d 302 (1962). 
/ 
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affirmatively express a proper business purpose. In rejecting this conten-
tion, the Court of Appeals held that the Maryland statute does not embody 
such a requirement. 17 
The question remains, however, what are the permissible and proper 
business objectives of a voting trust? One legal commentator has suggested 
that, in the absence of a showing of fraud, unfairness, oppression or other 
wrong to the stockholders, creditors or the corporation itself, any legitimate 
purpose, not in contravention of statutory or charter provisions, is 
permissible. IS 
Voting trusts are commonly used to retain the existing management of 
the corporation. Perpetuation of control, as an end in itself, however, has 
been held to be an improper purpose, 19 particularly where the only apparent 
reason for the voting trust has been to insure the retention of "lucrative 
positions" with the corporation. 20 However, use of the voting trust to insure 
stability and continuity of management, especially successful manage-
ment, has been held to be a proper purpose. 21 As might be expected, the line 
between these two objectives can at times be extremely tenuous and 
subjective. The validity of a particular voting trust often will depend upon 
the particular facts surrounding its creation and whether the voting trust 
results in fraud upon, or unfairness to, non-participating stockholders and 
creditors of the corporation. 
Voting trusts frequently have been used by creditors to insure stable and 
responsible management during the term of the financial obligation. 22 Such 
a purpose has met with judicial approval. 23 Used in this manner, the voting 
trust can be more flexible than conventional contract restrictions in 
guaranteeing managerial and financial policies approved by the creditors. 
However, counsel must bear in mind the fact that directors elected by a 
17. [d. at 369, 180 A.2d at 307. 
18. 5A CAVITCH §111.02. 
19. Lebus v. Stansifer, 154 Ky. 444, 157 S.W. 727 (1913); Grogan v. Grogan, 315 S.W.2d 34 
(Tex. Civ. App. 1958), writ of error denied, 159 Tex. 392, 322 S.W.2d 514 (1959). 
20. Grogan v. Grogan, 315 S.W.2d 34 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958), writ of error denied, 159 Tex. 392, 
322 S.W.2d 514 (1959). 
21. Machin v. Nicollet Hotel, 25 F.2d 783 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 278 U.S. 618 (1928); Adams 
v. Clearance Corp., 35 Del. Ch. 318, 116 A.2d 893 (1955), affd, 35 Del. Ch. 459, 121 A.2d 
302 (1956); Thomas v. Kliesen, 166 Kan. 337, 201 P.2d 663 (1949); Sagalyn v. Meekins, 
Pachard and Wheat, 290 Mass. 434, 195 N.E. 769 (1935); Herman v. Dereozewski, 312 
Mich. 244, 20 N.W.2d 176 (1945); Dal·Tran Servo CO. V. Fifth Ave. Coach Lines, Inc., 14 
App. Div. 2d 349, 220 N. Y.S.2d 549 (1961); Boyer v. Nesbitt, 227 Pa. 398, 76 A. 103 (1910); 
Alderman V. Alderman, 178 S.C. 9, 181 S.E. 897 (1935). 
22. See, e.g., CARY, supra note 1, at 401, on the use of a voting trust as a condition for a $165 
million loan to Trans World Airlines, the purpose of the trust being to escape Howard 
Hughes, who creditors regarded as a disruptive influence, from TWA's management. 
23. Irving Bank-Columbia Trust CO. V. Stoddard, 292 F. 815 (1st Cir. 1923); Belle Isle Corp. v. 
Corcoran, 29 Del. Ch. 554,49 A.2d 1 (1946); Massa V. Stone, 346 Mass. 67,190 N.E.2d 217 
(19133); Hart V. Bell, 222 Minn. 69, 23 N.W.2d 375, opinion supplemented, 222 Minn. 69, 
24 N.W.2d 41 (1946); Trefethen V. Amazeen, 93 N.H. 110, 36 A.2d 266 (1944); Madsen V. 
Burns Bros., 108 N.J. Eq. 275, 1.'i5 A. 28 (1931); Almiral & CO. V. McClement, 207 App. 
Div. 320, 202 N.Y.S. 139 (1923), affd, 239 N.Y. 630, 147 N.E. 225 (1925); Rossmassler V. 
Spielberger, 270 Pa. 30, 112 A. 876 (1921); Thompson-Starrett Co. v. E.B. Ellis Granite 
Co., 86 Vt. 282, 84 A. 1017 (1912). 
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creditor-appointed voting trustee retain a primary obligation to the 
corporation and must act in the corporation's best interest. 24 The voting 
trust also has been used to insure stability in a reorganized, formerly 
insolvent, corporation,25 or to implement a legally required severance of 
control. 26 
As previously noted, the creation and regulation of voting trusts is 
governed by statute in all but one state. 27 Because most of these statutes 
attempt to merely codify the common law, there is a great deal of 
uniformity among them. In general, most statutes require the following 
steps to be taken in creating a voting trust: 
First, most states, including Maryland,28 require that the voting trust 
agreement be in writing. Even in the absence of a statutory requirement, 
the Statute of Frauds provision relating to contracts not to be performed 
within one year would require most voting trust agreements to be in writing. 
Trusts with less than a year's duration are rare because a transfer of voting 
power for a relatively short period of time is usually accomplished by proxy. 
Secondly, most statutes require that a copy or duplicate of the voting trust 
agreement be filed with the corporation. For example, the Maryland 
provision requires that an "executed copy" be deposited with the corpora-
tion "at its principal office."29 The purpose of this requirement is to give 
stockholders, particularly those not participating, an opportunity to inspect 
the voting trust agreement. In Maryland, shareholders have the specific 
right to inspect "any voting trust agreement on file in the office of the 
corporation."3o This requirement parallels the general statutory right of 
shareholders to inspect corporate records. 31 Further, Maryland, like most 
jurisdictions, gives the voting trust certificate holders the same right to 
inspect corporate records as is given to regular stockholders. 32 
Thirdly, most statutes like the Maryland law, require that the shares 
subject to the agreement be deposited or transferred to the voting trustee. 
Some statutes also expressly require the trustee to surrender the stock 
certificates to the corporation in return for a new certificate issued in the 
name of the trustee. This latter provision is absent from the Maryland law 
and it appears that the actual transfer of legal title on the stock ledgers of 
24. CARY, supra note 1, at 402. 
25. See, e.g., In re Tower Broadway Properties, 58 F. Supp. 615 (S.D. N.Y. 1945). 
26. See, e.g., Cascade Nature Gas Corp. v. El Paso Nature Gas Co., 386 U.S. 129 (1967). 
27. See note 13 supra. 
28. MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, § 45 (1973). 
29. Id. What happens if one fails to comply with the exact requirements of the Maryland 
statute, e.g., by filing a photostatic copy of the signed agreement, is unclear. No Maryland 
cases have considered this question. In a New York case, DeMarco v. Paramount Ice 
Corp., 30 Misc. 2d 158, 102 N.Y.S.2d 692 (1950), the court held that the failure to file the 
voting trust agreement with the corporation did not render the agreement void ab initio, 
but simply made it inoperative until there was compliance with the statute. On the other 
hand, a Louisiana court held that a photostat of the voting trust agreement which did not 
contain the signature of the stockholders did not satisfy the statutory requirement that a 
"copy" of the agreement be filed. State v. Keystone Life Ins. Co., 9350. 2d 565 (La. 1957). 
30. MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, §51 (1973). 
31. See, e.g., ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT §52 (1971). 
32. MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, §51 (1973). 
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the corporation is unnecessary. 33 As a practical matter, however, the stock 
certificates transferred to the voting trustee are almost always submitted to 
the corporation and a new certificate representing the shares held in trust is 
issued in the name of the trustee. The new certificate should clearly 
indicate that legal title is held in a trust capacity and that it is subject to a 
voting trust agreement on file with the corporation. If the corporation is a 
party to the agreement, such a legend may be mandatory. 34 
Finally, several statutes specifically provide for the issuance of voting 
trust certificates by the trustee to the participating stockholders.35 Al-
though the Maryland statute contains no such requirement, their use is 
apparently assumed by Section 51(c) of the Corporation Code, relating to 
stockholders' rights of inspection. 36 In any event, in states where there is no 
such requirement, the use of voting trust certificates is almost a universal 
practice. 
Voting trust certificates usually outline the salient features of the voting 
trust agreement. Common provisions usually include the following nota-
tions: that the voting trust certificate has been issued pursuant to, and the 
rights ofthe certificate holder are subject to and governed by, a voting trust 
agreement of a certain date, a copy of which is on file with the corporation; 
that the voting trustee shall be entitled to vote the underlying stock on all 
matters and possess all stockholder rights of every kind, except as otherwise 
expressly provided in the agreement, until the expiration of the voting 
trust; that the certificate holder shall be entitled to all dividends received 
by the voting trustee with respect to the entrusted stock; that the certificate 
is transferable on the records of the voting trustee; that the trust terminates 
upon a certain date (or sooner upon conditions set forth in the voting trust 
agreement); and, that the certificate holder shall be entitled to a certain 
number of shares of stock in the corporation in exchange for the certificates 
upon termination of the voting trust. 
Voting trust certificates are "securities" as that term is defined by 
Section 2(1) of the Securities Act of 1933,37 and by many similar provisions 
under the various state securities laws. As such, any offer or sale of these 
certificates must be in compliance with these laws. Therefore, the certifi-
cates should have a legend which clearly indicates that any offer to sell, sale 
or other transfer of the certificates, or the underlying shares of stock, must 
be in compliance with the Securities Act of 1933 and applicable state law. 
33. See id. §44(b). Note, however, that a transfer of the shares into the voting trustee's name 
on the corporation's stock ledger might be required in order to avoid a conflict with the 
typical by-law provision that the corporation is entitled to treat the holder ofrecord as the 
holder in fact of any shares. 
34. Every certificate representing shares which are restricted or limited as to 
transferability by the corporation issuing such shares shan either (i) set forth upon 
the face or back of the certificate a fun statement of such restriction or limitation or 
(ii) state that the corporation win furnish such a statement upon request and 
without charge to any holder of such shares. Nothing in this paragraph shan be 
deemed to affect the provisions of Section 8-204 of Article 95B. 
MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, 27(c) (1973). 
35. See ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT §34, ~3.03(2) (1971). 
36. See note 31 supra. 
37. 15 U .S.C. §77b(l) (1970). 
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It would be difficult to enumerate all possible provisions includable in a 
voting trust agreement. In fact, such an undertaking would serve little or no 
purpose because each voting trust agreement should be tailored to its own 
particular set of facts. Further, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to 
cover the multitude of circumstances that might necessitate a voting trust 
agreement. Instead, a checklist of general considerations, set forth in 
summary fashion, is offered below, in order to assist the practitioner in the 
initial stages of drafting a voting trust agreement. 38 
(1) Parties to the agreement; right of other stockholders to join the voting 
trust. The voting trust agreement typically begins with a recital that the 
agreement is between and among certain named stockholders and trustees. 
The agreement will also contain the number and class of shares placed in 
the voting trust, usually adjacent to the stockholders' signatures at the end 
of the document. Often the corporation issuing the shares will be a party to 
the agreement, particularly where the corporation undertakes obligations 
towards the participating stockholders and voting trustees. Some states 
require voting trusts to be open to all stockholders who wish to 
participate. 39 Such a requirement was deleted from Maryland's statute in 
1971 because it was thought that an "open end" voting trust constituted an 
"offering" under the securities laws. 40 As a general rule, an "open end" , 
provision should be avoided unless there is a compelling reason for its use, 
and, if there is a need for provision allowing any stockholder to join in the 
future, care should be exercised to insure that the resulting "offering" is 
exempt under state and federal securities laws. 
(2) Recital of purpose. It is common to insert a purpose clause in the 
agreement, even though purpose clauses are not required 41 and seem to be 
ineffective. The recital of a laudable purpose will not redeem a voting trust 
created to accomplish an improper purpose. However, a purpose clause will 
have some value in instances where the agreement is ambiguous. Thus, a 
tightly-drawn purpose clause may serve as an additional safeguard where 
participating stockholders desire to limit the powers of the voting trustee. 
(3) Term of agreement. Most jurisdictions limit the duration of the voting 
trust. The majority of the statutes have a 10 year limitation, although some 
statutes have limitations that vary from 5 to 21 years. Maryland has 
adopted a 10 year limitation. In Holmes v. Sharretts, the voting trust 
agreement failed to state that it would terminate after 10 years, although 
the agreement did state that it was to be construed in accordance with 
Maryland law. The Court of Appeals held that a 10 year limitation was 
implicit in the agreement because 'Of this reference to Maryland law, as well 
as the fact that the surrounding circumstances indicated that the voting 
38. For forms of voting trust agreements, see 6 AM. JUR. LEGAL FORMS 2d, §74: 1345·65 (1972); 
E. BELSHEIM, MODERN LEGAL FORMS §3012 (1966); NICHOLS CYCLOPEDIA OF LEGAL FORMS 
§§9.770-.773r (1963); 6 J. RABKIN & M. JOHNSON, CURRENT LEGAL FORMS WITH TAX 
ANALYSIS, Nos. 15.59-.62 (1971). 
39. See 5A CAVITCH §1l1.08 n.1. 
40. MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, §45 (1973), Comment. See also 1 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 
656 (1961). 
41. See Holmes v. Sharretts, 228 Md. 358, 180 A.2d 302 (1962). 
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trust would certainly terminate within the 10 year limit.42 Despite the 
holding of Holmes, a well drafted agreement should set forth the term of the 
voting trust. If the trust is to terminate upon the happening of a certain 
contingency, the agreement should provide for termination upon the earlier 
of either the happening of the contingency or the 10th anniversary of the 
trust. 
(4) Renewal or extension of voting trust. Many statutes authorize the 
extension or renewal of voting trustS. 43 These statutes generally provide 
that, within a certain time before expiration of the original term, or last 
extension, anyone or more of the voting trust certificate holders may, by 
written agreement, and with the written consent of the voting trustee, 
extend the voting trust agreement with respect to the stock subject to their 
beneficial interest for an additional term, not to exceed a certain number of 
years.44 In addition, these statutes usually provide· that the rights and 
obligations of voting trust certificate holders who decline to participate in 
an extension are not effected. 45 It is clear that even without specific 
statutory authorization, upon termination of a voting trust any of the 
parties may participate in a succeeding trust. 46 
Of course, any party to the first voting trust has the right to decline to 
participate in the succeeding trust. The only benefit of the statutory 
authorization is that it abrogates the necessity of formally dissolving the 
original trust and creating a new one. An interesting question that arises is 
whether a voting trust agreement can provide that, upon the expiration of 
the initial term, either a certain percentage of the voting trust certificate 
holders or the voting trustee can elect to extend or renew the term of the 
trust and thereby bind all parties. It would seem that in jurisdictions having 
statutory provisions for renewal, any clause in the agreement in contraven-
tion of the particular statute would be invalid. 47 On the other hand, in 
42. 228 Md. 358, 367-68, 180 A.2d 302, 305-06 (1962). 
43. See 5A CAVITCH §111.05 [1] n.9. 
44. A typical extension provision is: 
'At any time within two years prior to the time of expiration of any voting 
trust agreement as originally fixed or as last extended as provided in this 
subsection, one or more beneficiaries of the trust under the voting trust 
agreement may, by written agreement and with the written consent of the 
voting trustee or trustees, extend the duration of the voting trust agreement for 
an additional period not exceeding ten years from the expiration date of the 
trust as originally fixed or as last extended in this subsection. The voting 
trustee or trustees shall, prior to the time of expiration of any such voting trust 
agreement, as originally fixed or as previously extended, as the case may be, file 
in the registered office of the corporation in this State a copy of such extension 
agreement and of his or their consent thereto, and thereupon the duration of the 
voting trust agreement shall be extended for the period fixed in the extension 
agreement; but no such extension agreement shall affect the rights or 
obligations of persons not parties thereto. 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §218(b) (1975). 
45. But see OHIO REV. CODE §1701.49(B) (1964), which permits the majority in interest of the 
beneficial owners to extend, if the agreement so provides, and makes no provision for 
withdrawal by dissenters. 
46. Mannheimer v. Keehn, 30 Misc. 584, 41 N.Y.S.2d 542 (Sup. Ct. 1943), modified on other 
grounds, 268 App. Div. 845, 51 N.Y.S.2d 750 (1944). 
47. Cf. Belle Isle v. Corcoran, 29 Del. Ch. 554, 49 A.2d 1 (Sup. Ct. 1946). 
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jurisdictions, like Maryland, where there are no specific statutory provisions 
governing extension, it seems that the validity of such a clause should 
depend upon whether the provision causes the aggregate term of the voting 
trust to extend beyond the maximum permitted by statute. 48 
(5) Revocation of voting trust. Participating stockholders may wish to 
retain the power of termination by providing that a prescribed majority in 
interest may terminate the voting trust at any time or upon any other 
express condition. 49 
(6) Filing copy of voting trust agreement with the corporation. The 
agreement should specifically require the voting trustee to file an executed 
copy of the voting trust agreement with the corporation at its principal 
office. 
(7) Transfer of stock to voting trustee; transfer on the corporation's 
records. The agreement should set forth the mechanics by which the shares 
subject to the agreement are to be assigned to the voting trustee. The 
agreement should also authorize the trustee to submit the endorsed stock 
certificates to the corporation for cancellation and transfer on the corporate 
books, and for issuance of a new certificate in the name of the voting 
trustee. 
(8) Issuance of voting trust certificates. The voting trust agreement 
should also set forth t.he procedure by which the trustee should issue vot.ing 
trust certificates, as well as the form and characteristics of such 
certificates. 50 It is advisable to attach a specimen certificate to the 
agreement as an exhibit, or to set forth in the agreement the complete text 
printed on the face of the voting trust certificates. 
(9) Transfer of voting trust certificates. The agreement should establish 
the method by which voting trust certificates are to be transferrred. The 
agreement should also require the voting trustee to maintain a ledger listing 
the names and addresses of all voting trust certificate holders and the 
number of shares held by each. There should be a provision in the 
agreement for inspection of the trustee's records by certificate holders and 
other stockholders. The agreement should note any restrictive legends to be 
placed on the certificates in compliance with federal and state securities 
laws. In addition, if the underlying shares are subject to any charter 
provision or stockholder agreement restricting their transferability, such 
restrictions should also be legended on the voting trust certificates. 
(10) Exchange of voting trust certificate for shares of stock upon 
termination of voting trust. A significant aspect of the equitable interest in 
the trust is the right, upon the trust's termination, to receive a share of 
stock for each share represented by the voting trust certificate. The 
agreement should set forth the right and mechanics of accomplishing the 
48. But see 1 G. HORNSTEIN, CORPORATION LAw AND PRACTICE §215, at 297 (1959). 
49. It should be noted that the California statute permits a majority of the participating 
stockholders to revoke the trust at any time despite contrary provisions in the trust 
agreement. CAL. CORP. CODE §2231 (West 1954). See also MINN. STAT. ANN. §301.27(1) 
(1969), which permits a majority of participating stockholders to revoke unless otherwise 
provided in the voting trust agreement. 
50. See p. 250 supra with respect to provisions that should be on the voting trusts certificates. 
254 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 4 
exchange. The agreement should also address the situation where a 
beneficiary is missing or for some other reason fails to surrender the voting 
trust certificate. For example, the voting trustee could be given the right to 
turn the stock certificate over to the issuing corporation to hold on behalf of 
the participating stockholder, thereby relieving the trustee of liability. 
(11) Distributions by the corporation. Normally voting trust certificate 
holders retain their right to receive dividends in cash or property. However, 
the right to receive any distributions will depend on the purpose of the 
voting trust. The agreement should specifically address the handling of 
liquidating distributions. In addition, any distribution of voting stock 
should become subject to the trust. 
(12) Successor voting trustees. The voting trust agreement should provide 
for successor voting trustees, either by specifically naming the successors or 
by providing some method of choosing successors wpen a trustee dies, 
resigns, is removed for cause, or is incapacitated or otherwise unable to 
act.51 Under normal circumstances, the agreement should also give the 
voting trustee the right to resign and indicate the method of resignation. 
(13) Casting shareholder votes when there are several voting trustees. 
When the agreement appoints two or more trustees to serve concurrently, a 
procedure for voting the underlying shares should be established, particu-
larly where the voting trustees are equally divided over an issue. In the 
latter case, the vote could be equally divided among the voting trustees, or a 
third party, whose decision will bind all of the trustees, could be appointed. 
As a third alternative, the agreement could provide that the stock will not 
be voted unless there is unanimity among the trustees. This last approach is 
dangerous because the corporation might then be controlled by a small 
minority of non-participating stockholders. 52 Further, if all of the corpora-
tion's shares are held by the trustees, the corporation as well as the trust 
would be deadlocked. 
(14) Power of the voting trustee. The voting trust agreement should 
delineate the duties and powers of the trustee. 53 In particular, the 
51. Several statutes provide that vacancies among the trustees shall be filled by the remaining 
trustees unless otherwise provided in the trust agreement. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. 
§30-135(7)(c) (1967); LA. REV. STAT. §12:78(F)(3) (1969); MINN. STAT. ANN. §301.27(3) 
(1969); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §1.66(F)(3) (1953). 
52. Assuming that, in spite of the trustee's deadlock, they are present at the stockholders' 
meeting so that quorum requirements are met. 
53. It is important to note that most jurisdictions, including Maryland, view a voting trust as 
subject to the law applicable to equitable trusts and the trustee as a trustee in the 
equitable sense. Brown v. McLanahan, 148 F.2d 703 (4th Cir. 1945). Therefore, the 
trustee's exercise of powers granted under the voting trust agreement is subject to the 
obligations an equitable trustee owes to beneficiaries. Cavitch lists the following 
obligations as being charged to a voting trustee: 
(1) They have a fiduciary oblication to administer for the best interests of all the 
beneficiaries or cestuis que trust. 
(2) When they represent different classes of shareholders, they may not favor one 
class at the expense of another. 
(3) Similarly, voting trustees may not exercise their powers to further their own 
interests to the detriment of some or all of the beneficiaries. 
(4) Voting trustees may alstf have the power and even the duty to protect the in-
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agreement should clearly indicate whether the trustee may vote the 
underlying shares only on such matters as the election of directors, approval 
of auditors and other routine affairs, or whether the trustee's voting rights 
extend to more fundamental matters such as mergers, redemptions, sales of 
assets, amending the articles of incorporation or by-laws, increasing the 
authorized number of shares, creating new classes of stock or dissolving the 
corporation. These provisions go to the heart of the voting trust agreement. 
Consequently, the courts tend to deny powers asserted by the trustee which 
are not clearly and expressly conferred, particularly with respect to the 
right to decide upon fundamental changes in corporate structure. 54 The 
voting trust statute in one jurisdiction requires that the participating 
stockholders reserve the voting power on such fundamental matters, 55 while 
most jurisdictions permit assignment of this power to the trustee. 
(15) Voting instructions to the voting trustee. Frequently, the agreement 
will direct the trustee to vote for certain persons as directors, or in a certain 
way ona particular issue. In Maryland, this device may also be used to 
insl,lre the election of certain individuals as officers, because officers can be 
elected by the stockholders if the by-laws so provide. 56 
(16) Compensation of voting trustee; reimbursement for expenses of 
trust. The voting trust agreement should indicate whether the voting 
trustee is to receive compensation. Most trustees serve without compensa-
tion. The agreement should also establish the trustee's right to reimburse-
ment by the participating stockholders for expenses incurred in administer-
ing the trust. Agreements commonly give the trustee the right to deduct 
expenses from any dividends received before redistributing them to the 
voting trust certificate holders. 
(17) Limitation on personal liability of voting trustee; indemnification. 
Voting trust agreements will often attempt to limit the personal liability of 
the trustee to the beneficiaries for his votes and other actions. These 
exculpatory clauses generally provide that the voting trustee shall not be 
liable for any error of law or for any act committed or omitted, except for 
willful misconduct or gross negligence. Any attempt to completely exoner-
ate the trustee from liability is generally ineffective on public policy 
grounds which will refuse "to relieve the trustee of liability for breach of 
trust committed in bad faith or intentionally or with reckless indifference to 
tegrity of the trust by defending against a suit to invalidate it when they have 
reasonable grounds to believe that the attack is without justification. 
1 CAVITCH §11l.06(3) (citations omitted). 
54. See, e.g., KuUgren v. Navy Gas and Supply Co., 110 Colo. 454, 135 P.2d 1007 (1943); 
Nelson v. Amling, 319 Ill. App. 571, 49 N.E.2d 868 (194;3); Ohio Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. 
Struble, 82 Ohio App. 480, 81 N.E.2d 622, appeal dismissed, 150 Ohio St. 409, 82 N.E.2d 
856 (1948), 
55. Notwithstanding the provisions of this 'Section ... the holders of record of the 
voting trust certificates shall have the same rights as if they were shareholders of 
record with respect to voting upon any amendment of the charter, amendment of 
the bylaws, reduction of stated capital, sale of the entire assets, merger, consolida-
tion or dissolution .... 
N.C. GEN. STAT. §55-72(c) (Supp. 1974). 
56. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, §60(a) (1973). 
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the interests of the beneficiary, or of liability for any profit which the trustee 
has derived from a breach of trust." 57 It is also common for the agreement to 
provide that the beneficiaries of the trust shall indemnify and hold 
harmless the trustee from liability incurred by the trustee in actions brought 
by non-participating stockholders. 
(18) Trustees as officers and directors; interested transactions; proxies; 
trustee's rights to join the trust. There are several miscellaneous matters 
which also should be covered by the voting trust agreement. First, there 
should be a provision specifying whether the trustee can serve as an officer 
or director of the corporation. In addition, it is advisable to specifically 
permit the voting trustee or any firm of which he is a member, or any 
corporation of which he is a stockholder, director or officer, or any firm, 
association or corporation in which he has an interest, to contract with the 
corporation or to become pecuniarily interested in any matter or transac-
tion in which the corporation may be involved. Further, agreements will 
generally authorize the trustee to vote by proxy, although it seems that 
Maryland law would permit the voting trustee to use a proxy even without 
specific authorization in the agreement. Finally, the agreement will usually 
permit the voting trustee to be a participating stockholder. 
(19) Acceptance of the trust. As a matter of formality, the voting trust 
agreement usually contains a provision whereby the trust is accepted by the 
voting trustee. Such a provision seems to be superfluous because the 
execution of the agreement by the trustee evidences his acceptance of the 
trust and of his duties. 
There are some disadvantages inherent in the use of voting trusts in lieu 
of other corporate control devices. A major disadvantage is the fact that a 
voting trust will disqualify a corporation as a "small business corporation" 
under Subchapter S of the Internal Revenue Code. 58 To qualify for 
Subchapter S status, a corporation must not have "as a shareholder a 
person (other than an estate) who is not an individual .... "59 The 
regulations specifically treat voting trusts as disqualifying shareholders,60 
although the position taken by the regulations has been rejected by one 
District Court. 61 Another disadvantage in using a voting trust is the 10 year 
limitation found in most statutes. There is also the problem of strictly 
complying with the technical statutory requirements which must be 
satisfied to assure the trust's validity. Finally, there is the disadvantage 
of "public disclosure" of the agreement resulting when it is filed with the 
corporation. But in spite of these disadvantages, the voting trust is often a 
useful and appropriate device for maintaining corporate control. Its 
57. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §222(2) (1959). 
58. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§1371·79. 
59. [d. §1371(a)(2). 
60. Treas. Reg. §§1.1371·l(d)(1), 1.1371-l(e) (1959). See also Rev. Rul. 63-226, 1963-2 CUM. 
BULL. 341. 
61. A & N Furniture & Appliance Co. v. United States, 271 F. Supp. 40 (S.D. Ohio 1967). 
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self-executing nature gives it a distinct advantage over other control 
devices. Moreover, by vesting voting rights in a trustee with rather broad 
discretionary powers to vote the underlying stock, the voting trust is more 
flexible than other control devices which may inadequately anticipate 
problems that may arise in the future requiring stockholder action. 
